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Abstract 
The paper discusses the rise of the East India Company in the 
contested political world of eighteenth century India, with reference to the 
manner in which economic power was deployed to enhance military 
power. It is shown that there was only one model of successful ‘military-
fiscalism’ in this time, represented by the Company. The Company’s 
strategies, however, cannot be understood as a transplantation of 
European practices into India. Local factors, such as opportunism and 
access to the natural resources of the eastern Gangetic were important. 
However, institutional choices mattered, and owed in part to the 
Europeans’ outsider status. 
 
 
Introduction 
Comparisons between early modern Europe and Asia in political 
terms are of abiding interest to global historians.2 Two types of motivation 
drive such comparisons. One of these is to explain Europe’s precocious 
economic growth. And another is to explain colonization and conquest of 
Asian regions by Europe. The former enquiry has sometimes followed up 
the contrast between Europe’s competitive state systems and Asia’s 
empires, and suggested, as Eric Jones does, that political competition led 
in Europe to sovereign dependence on capital and to ‘continual borrowing 
and .. “stimulus diffusion”’ whereas the ‘despotism’ of the east functioned 
as ‘a revenue pump’ in the best of times, deteriorating into a chaotic 
‘fluctuations without development’ in the eighteenth century.3 The case 
                                                            
1 Revised version of paper for Asian Historical Economics Conference, Centre for 
China in the World Economy, Tsinghua University, May 19-21, 2010, Beijing. 
2 P.H.H. Vries, ‘Governing Growth: A Comparative Analysis of the Role of the State in 
the Rise of the West’, Journal of World History, 13(1), 2002, pp. 67-138. 
3 The European Miracle, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. xxx, 45, 161, 
171, 206. 
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for a contrast between dependent and despotic kings is undermined by 
the post-1980 scholarship on Indian empires, which projects a negotiat
rather than hierarchical relationship between sovereigns and communities 
in this region. That criticism still leaves us with the question, how do we 
think about conquest and colonization in comparative terms? 
ed 
                                                           
Again eighteenth century India presents a problem for global 
history. In Europe, the outcome of political competition was states that 
grew in size and capacity, as the kings tried to take control of the 
economic means of financing wars, eventually redefining the role of the 
state in relation to the society. The European states in the eighteenth 
century had been moving towards sovereign control of the fiscal and the 
military apparatus, away from dependence on mercenaries, creditors, and 
contractors.4 The phrase, military-fiscalism, coined by Martin Wolfe in the 
context of Renaissance France, is frequently used to suggest a co-
evolution of fiscal capacity and military capacity.5 The attendant growth of 
‘social power’ through a process of conflict brought about the nation state 
and the state structures that defined European modernization.6 In India 
too the dominant trend in this time was increasing contest between 
regimes that had succeeded the Mughal Empire. The break-up of the 
empire, and the struggle for revenue among contenders, unleashed much 
potential for violence. Rulers, noblemen, commanders, and underneath 
them, dominant peasant clans more or less lived in a state of war, 
 
4 Charles Tilly, ‘Cities and States in Europe, 1000-1800’, Theory and Society, 18(5), 
1989, pp. 563-584. Mobilization of resources for war as a catalyst in the making of the 
fiscal system is emphasized in Patrick K. O'Brien, ‘The Political Economy of British 
Taxation, 1660-1815’, Economic History Review, 41(1), 1988, pp. 1-32, and in the 
formation of nation states by Brian Downing, The Military Revolution and Political 
Change in Early Modern Europe, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991. For an 
analytical treatment of the contribution of war to state capacity, see Timothy Besley and 
Torsten Persson, ‘The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and 
Politics, American Economic Review, 99(4), 2009 , pp. 1218-44. 
5 The Fiscal System of Renaissance France, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972. 
6 Michael Mann, Sources of Social Power, vol. 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1986. 
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especially in western and northern India. All of them were desperately 
seeking money and the means to acquire more money to finance warfare. 
And yet, the outcome of that contest was not collective empowerment of 
the states after the pattern of Western Europe, but something quite the 
opposite, a collective disempowerment and collapse. In keeping up the 
military enterprise, almost all of these political actors ran into fiscal crisis 
and the states that they tried to erect even shrank in size. 
There was one large exception to this picture, and that was the 
English East India Company. The contest ended with the hegemony of 
the Company. One way of approaching the subject, therefore, would be to 
try to explain the final outcome of the competition. How did a company of 
foreign merchants triumph over powerful and militaristic Indian kings? Did 
military-fiscal strategies contribute to the rise of the Company? Did the 
European origin of the Company have any role to play in their military-
fiscal enterprise? The paper is an attempt to answer these three 
questions. 
Most answers to the first question now available can be grouped 
under two heads, and called the fall-of-the-Indians and the rise-of-the-
west stories. The oldest view was articulated in nineteenth century 
imperialist history and carried over into Indian nationalistic narratives of 
colonization. The point of emphasis was the exceptional features of the 
Indian state. Autocratic regimes collapsed under the weight of their own 
contradictions. ‘Organized power having broken the field was left open for 
adventurers.’7 A variation of the theme can be found in the regional 
historiography of the Maratha domain, which attributes military debacles 
to ‘the feudal system and its fatal results’, and to quarrels amongst 
chieftains.8 The second position attributes the outcome of the contest to 
                                                            
7 Jawaharlal Nehru, Discovery of India, London: Meridien, 1946, p. 230. 
8 R.V.Nadkarni, The Rise and Fall of the Maratha Domain, Bombay: Popular 
Prakashan, 1966, the cited text is the title of a section, pp. 352-363; The works of G.S. 
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the Europeans’ mercantilist ambitions, imperialist drive, and superior 
military organization and technology.9 ‘Britain’, it is suggested, ‘was 
committed to securing its Indian interests at all costs’.10 The Europeans 
had an acknowledged lead in naval warfare. The decisive battles in the 
eighteenth century, however, were fought on land. In land warfare, the 
Europeans brought into India, if not a decisive advantage, some useful 
knowledge relating to infantry formation, command structure, 
professionalized officer corps, flintlock guns, cannons of cast iron, and 
mobile artillery.11 The Company’s superior financial capacity enabled it ‘to 
field a larger army than its Indian rivals’.12 Others contend that the entire 
‘conquest of India’ built upon opportunism, ‘perfidious deals’ that the 
Europeans struck with enemy factions and the wealthy merchants and 
bankers.13 
Not all accounts of politics fit these overarching models. Uneasily 
co-existing with the failure of the Indians and the ingenuity of the 
Europeans is a third factor, luck, insofar as the Europeans had 
entrenched themselves in one of the resource-rich regions of India, the 
eastern Gangetic.14 Further, influential readings on northern India invite 
us to look at the changing structures of collaboration that the regional 
states depended on. In one view, agrarian and commercial expansion in 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Sardesai, V.S. Khare, and others discussed leadership issues, see A.R. Kulkarni, The 
Marathas, New Delhi: Books and Books, 1996, pp. 177-180. 
9 On mercantilism, Vries, ‘Governing Growth’. 
10 Barbara and Thomas Metcalf, A Concise History of India, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001, p. 53. 
11 Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West 
1500-1800, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 136. Also G.J. Bryant, 
‘Asymmetric Warfare: The British Experience in Eighteenth-Century India’, The Journal 
of Military History, 68(2), 2004, pp. 431-469. 
12 Metcalf and Metcalf, Concise History of India, p. 54. 
13 Deepak Lal, ‘Asia and Western Dominance’, Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, 
8(3), 2003, pp. 283-99. 
14 ‘The English already held the most prosperous regions’, writes Stewart Gordon, The 
Marathas 1600-1818, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 193. C.A. 
Bayly notes ‘the lack of resources’ of the lands that formed the heart of the Maratha 
domain, Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990, p. 102. 
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the seventeenth century had empowered the landed gentry, merchants, 
bankers, scribes, and other literate officers of the state.15 The position of 
these groups, whose members did not come from traditional families 
holding military and fiscal tenures, was further strengthened in the 
eighteenth century via revenue farming on which the post-Mughal states 
depended. First advanced for the western Gangetic plains, capitalist 
consolidation was later extended to states in peninsular India.16 The 
accumulation of wealth among Indian merchants and bankers was 
potentially destabilizing for the regional states, because the interests of 
the former were more consistent with those of the Company than of the 
Indian nobility. The European trade settlements attracted merchants and 
bankers from all over India. The first major military encounter between the 
Company and a provincial army, the battle of Plassey (1757), has been 
described as ‘a transaction, not a battle’, by an Indian historian.17 Recent 
eighteenth century historiography makes a case that the Company State 
resembled the Indian states in aims and strategies too closely to permit 
seeing a rupture in the transition to British Empire. The thesis of merchant 
                                                            
15 C.A. Bayly, Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars: North Indian Society in the Age of 
British Expansion 1770-1870, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983; Muzaffar 
Alam, Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India: Awadh and the Punjab 1707-48, Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1986. 
16 The introductions of P.J. Marshall, ed., Eighteenth Century in Indian History: 
Evolution or Revolution?, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 1-30; Seema Alavi, 
ed., Eighteenth Century in India, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 1-56; Also 
useful are Om Prakash, ‘The Great Divergence: Evidence from Eighteenth Century 
India’, Paper presented at the Seventh GEHN Conference at Istanbul, 2005; Rajat 
Datta, ‘Commercialisation, Tribute, and the Transition from Late Mughal to Early 
Colonial in India’, Medieval History Journal, 6(2), 2003, pp. 259-291; Binay Chaudhuri, 
Peasant History of Late Pre-colonial and Colonial India, Delhi: Pearson Longman, 
2008, pp. 49-107. 
17 K.M. Panikkar, cited in Lal, ‘Asia and Western Dominance’. See also on merchant 
collaboration, David Washbrook, ‘India in the Early Modern World Economy: Modes of 
Production, Reproduction and Exchange’, Journal of Global History, 2(1), 2007, pp. 
87–111. For another statement, see David Arnold and Burton Stein, A History of India, 
Second Edition, Malden and Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 197-8. 
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collaboration illustrates the idea of a gradual evolution, even continuity 
between the pre-colonial and the colonial.18 
There is truth in all of these accounts. And yet, individually, each 
one of these positions raises problems. Concepts of the state underlying 
the decline story stand much revised. The suggestion that India’s ‘feudal’ 
order had something to do with battlefield outcomes implies that the 
crucial difference was an institutional one, but how the Europeans dealt 
with the Indian institutional order is left unsaid. The emphasis on 
quarrelsome leadership in Maratha history makes it difficult to compare 
the Maratha situation with those of the other Indian states.19 The rise-of-
the-west story is problematical too. Mercantilism did not easily translate 
into imperial expansionism in India.20 The relationship between the two 
motivations was complex and unpredictable. To suggest that making 
‘perfidious deals’ with factions of the enemy was a forte of the Europeans 
whereas their Indian adversaries were lost in innocence, is wrong on 
grounds of fact, as well as theory, since unprincipled intrigue as a weapon 
of war is sanctioned in all ancient Indian manuals on statecraft. 
The proposition that the Europeans possessed superior military 
knowledge lives uneasily with the fact that there was convergence in 
knowledge even as there was divergence in battlefield outcomes.21 The 
practice of hiring European mercenaries by the Indian regimes was so 
extensive that a distinction cannot be maintained between European and 
                                                            
18 ‘Introduction’, in Marshall, ed., Eighteenth Century; and ‘Introduction’, in Alavi, ed., 
Eighteenth Century. 
19 Mysore under Tipu Sultan, or Hyderabad under the Nizam-ul-mulk did not suffer from 
divided leadership. 
20 For at least thirty years after the Company registered a decisive military success in 
Bengal (Plassey, 1757), ‘[w]ar, conquest and the extension of territory were 
condemned as contrary to the interests of a trading company’ in the British political 
mainstream. P.J. Marshall, Problems of Empire: Britain and India 1757-1813, London: 
George Allen and Unwin, 1968, p. 63. 
21 On convergence, Kaushik Roy, ‘Military Synthesis in South Asia: Armies, Warfare, 
and Indian Society, c. 1740-1849’, The Journal of Military History, 69(3), 2005, pp. 651-
690, and John Pemble, ‘Resources and Techniques in the Second Maratha War’, The 
Historical Journal, 19(2), 1976, pp. 375-404. 
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Indian spheres of knowledge in the second half of the century.22 The 
distinction is blurred even more when we consider that the Company’s 
army relied mainly on Indian soldiers with a thin layer of European 
command above them. The proposition that the Europeans fielded larger 
armies in the most consequential battles is possibly wrong. What we can 
be sure of is that the proportion of regular soldiers was significantly higher 
in the Company army, and that the army expanded in the nineteenth 
century. If the composition of the army played any role, we need to ask 
why the Indian regimes were constrained from adopting the best strategy. 
To sum up the critique with a broader point, using the ethnicity of the ruler 
to make sense of state formation is likely to fail, for such an approach 
blurs similarities and convergent tendencies between the Indians and the 
Europeans, just as it blurs important points of distinctness amongst the 
Indian regimes. I return to this issue in the next section. 
Geography alone does not explain conquest, for the Europeans 
shared the fertile Gangetic floodplains with other regimes. If natural 
resources were all that mattered to military success, why did pre-colonial 
Bengal, Rohilkhand, or Awadh, all fortunately situated, cave in to the 
Afghans, Marathas, or the Europeans? Commercialization as a potentially 
destabilizing force needs to be treated with caution. The obvious 
objection to the view that capitalist consolidation weakened the Indian 
regimes is that these regimes were just as heavily dependent on the 
private sector as was the Company. On the other side, the equation 
between Indian commercial interests and the Company was not 
necessarily a stable one, and often characterized by elemental distrust. 
                                                            
22 The most famous examples were Tipu Sultan of Mysore, Mahadaji Sindhia (Shinde), 
ruler of the Bundelkhand arm of the Maratha domain, and Ranjit Singh of Punjab. On 
Mahadaji’s enterprise, see Letters, Political, Military and Commercial on the Present 
State and Government on the Province of Oudh and its Dependencies, c. 1793, p. 25. 
See also J.P. Thomson, ‘An Autobiographical Memoir of Louis Bourquien’, Journal of 
the Punjab Historical Society, 9(1), 1923, pp. 36-71. All of the rulers, and especially 
Mysore, tried to control trade in military equipment and manufactured cast-iron 
cannons under European supervision. 
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Further, banker support was hardly an independent variable in explaining 
the political or fiscal stability of regimes; the causation should run the 
other way. The new thinking on eighteenth century India, which too 
readily assumes that most regions experienced an energetic capitalist 
flourish, even economic growth, needs to convince the analytically 
oriented economic historian that commercial and economic growth were 
possible at all in the backdrop of small, vulnerable, and shrinking states 
left with too little money to spend on infrastructure and public goods. 
Finally, the precise connection between a wealthy private sector and 
battlefield outcomes remains to be shown.  
In some writings on eighteenth century state formation, it is 
recognized that battlefield strategies entailed fiscal innovations on both 
sides. In that spirit, Burton Stein read late-eighteenth century Mysore as 
an embryonic military-fiscal state.23 C.A. Bayly uses the idea to clarify the 
nature of western imperialist expansion in India.24 As these two examples 
might suggest, applying the concept of a single strategy to winners and 
losers alike deprives the concept of analytical value. Indeed, the 
emphasis in recent thinking on the element of continuity between the pre-
colonial and the colonial states results in ‘military fiscalism’ being applied 
somewhat indiscriminately to diverse contexts.25  
The arguments of the paper can now be briefly stated. I advance in 
this paper four connected theses on the colonization of India. 
First, there was only one model of successful military fiscalism in 
eighteenth century India, and it was represented by the East India 
Company. Several of the prominent Indian states, as they fought more 
                                                            
23 ‘State Formation and Economy Reconsidered. Part One’, Modern Asian Studies, 
19(3), 1985, pp. 387-413. 
24 ‘The British Military-Fiscal State and Indigenous Resistance. India 1750-1820’, in 
Lawrence Stone, ed., An Imperial State at War: Britain from 1689 to 1815, London and 
New York: Routledge, 1994, pp. 322-354. See also John Brewer, The Sinews of 
Power: War, Money, and the English State, 1688–1783, Cambridge Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1990. 
25 See for example, Alavi, ‘Introduction’. 
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battles, shrank in size. The Company alone managed to raise its revenue 
while continuing the war effort. The Company state, in this respect, did 
represent a revolutionary force in Indian politics, and a fundamental 
rupture in the concept of statecraft. The proposition, thus, entails a 
revision in the historiography of state formation in eighteenth century 
South Asia. 
Second, the Company’s success in this respect cannot be 
understood as a transplantation of European practices into India. In the 
middle of the eighteenth century, the political game being played by the 
Company was quite similar to that being played by its principal rivals. 
Wealth and power did not always join together in early eighteenth century 
India. Much negotiation and violence were a response to attempts by the 
militarily strong regimes hailing from resource-poor regions, regimes that I 
call commander-ruled, to stake a claim upon the revenue of the virtually 
stateless former imperial provinces, as well as that of the richer states 
that were controlled by the remnants of the imperial administration. If 
there was competition in this scenario, it was competition in a market for 
protection among the militarily weaker states, involving negotiation on the 
tribute to be paid in exchange for alliance against worse predators. In the 
1750s, the main contenders in northern India were the Afghans and the 
Marathas. In the second half of the century, the Marathas lost an 
important encounter, the Afghan factor receded, and the Company joined 
the contest as a worthy player. The emergence of new militarily strong 
regimes in the backdrop of a market for protection gave rise to two 
parallel modes of governance, ‘statism’ or attempts to control military and 
land revenue administration jointly, and ‘militarism’ or the superimposition 
of a centralized military outpost over a decentralized land revenue 
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administration.26 Until the very end of the century, major Indian powers 
tried to combine strategies. The Maratha domain combined a greater 
degree of statism in Maharashtra with militarism in Hindustan, the 
Company combined statism in Bengal with militarism in Awadh, and 
Mysore, while targeting Travancore for practice of militarism, tried to erect 
a statist setup in the core domain. 
Third, geography mattered. Seeds of a divergence can be found in 
the emerging pattern of control over regional resources. With its strategic 
base in the seas, the Company had secured itself in the littoral and deltaic 
zones. The productivity of land varied enormously between the 
floodplains of the Ganges and the dry interior, possibly by as much as a 
factor of four. Regions with higher land yield generated more revenue per 
square mile. The Company was fortunate in taking control of Bengal and 
Awadh, the two richest regions of India. Access to larger funding, and a 
favourable debt-income ratio, enabled it to expand the regular army, 
whereas there was a trend towards increasing dependence on 
mercenaries among its rivals. 
Fourth, geography alone cannot explain the divergence; 
institutional choices mattered too. The Indian states, which could sustain 
the military enterprise only by offering fiscal concessions and tenures to 
commanders, saw their power wither away in the presence of sustained 
conflict. The Company on the other hand recast the relationship between 
the state and the intermediate order of agents engaged in taxation, by 
making use of an unprecedented instrument, offer of marketable property 
rights to the landlords in exchange for compliance to the new military-
fiscal order. How do we understand this institutional difference? I submit 
that global (ideological) and local (geographical) factors need equal 
consideration, and in mutual relation. The Company did not originate in 
                                                            
26 These were not exclusive alternatives, in fact, statism would be impossible to attain 
without the capacity to perform militarism. Therefore, a militarily weak regime would 
have no choice at all. 
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an indigenous community, and therefore had no military heritage to 
defend, nor an interest in maintaining sectarian property rights. The fact 
that it came from a world which had been adapting to constant wars by 
means of centralization of finances and conscriptions, made it readier 
than any Indian state of the time to try to consolidate sovereignty. The 
Indian states had a path dependence to live with, namely, shared 
sovereignty with communities and individuals who supplied useful 
services, principally military services. Conflicts, therefore, led them to give 
away more powers. The higher revenue per area reduced the costs of 
territorial administration and policing potential rebels in the Company 
territories. In short, the coasts and flood-plains made military-fiscalism 
more promising than in the rocky landscape where Tipu Sultan designed 
his statist reforms. In the arid Deccan plateau and forested central India, 
devoid of good roads, much commerce, and large towns, it was 
considerably harder for the kings to shed their dependence on local 
bosses possessing adequate knowledge of the land and the means to 
coerce peasant headmen. 
 The rest of the paper has three main sections, dealing with, 
respectively, a restatement of political history that frames the whole 
project, discussion of fiscal policy, and institutional policy, respectively. 
The last section concludes. 
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The Political Process 
It is useful to begin with the Mughal polity. Generally speaking, 
medieval rulers maintained territorial control by assigning revenue grants 
to military commanders, who in turn relied on the local gentry for 
collection of taxes from the peasants, for organizing extension or 
improvement in cultivation, for maintenance of law and order, and for 
military supplies. In Mughal India, the command of cavalry was an honour 
bestowed by the Emperor for distinguished military service upon 
deserving candidates, and a mark of hereditary or acquired nobility. But 
such command was also a potential threat to royal power. The revenue 
assignment that the military elite were rewarded with (jagir), therefore, 
was in principle not a hereditary or proprietary one, but transferable. In its 
pure form, the jagir signified a notional share over a region’s tax 
resources; the holder of that office had little actual contact with the region 
concerned. Underneath these groups were the gentry or the landlords 
(zamindar), who lived in proximity of the peasant, collected and paid the 
land tax, and sometimes rose from the ranks of the peasants. Technically 
a tax-collector rather than proprietor, the landlord often enjoyed an 
effectively hereditary right. Like the jagirdars, they almost always owned 
arms, but their position was contingent on control of cultivation rather than 
control of soldiers. 
The situation in southern, western, and eastern India maintained 
broad similarity with the northern one on the point of a tiered structure of 
rights based on tax collection. One difference was that in peninsular India, 
local military authority was often vested in a tributary king. The tributary 
king lived on land tax, lived in a fort, was in command of an army at the 
service of the regional state, but did not necessarily belong in the nobility. 
In the Deccan sultanates and Gujarat, tributary kings were common 
figures in the eighteenth century. 
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Within a few years after the death of Aurangzeb (1707), the Mughal 
Empire began to disintegrate. The break-up of the Mughal Empire has 
been attributed to various factors, such as fiscal crisis generated by 
constant wars, Aurangzeb’s religious intolerance, the intrigue of nobles 
and ministers, and lack of financial support.27 Not all of these factors are 
relevant to this paper. One factor, however, is relevant. Between 1690 
and 1720, almost everywhere the equation between the four major 
constituents of early modern states – the king, the commander, the 
landlord, and the peasant – was beginning to change. In this backdrop, 
the formation of the successor states followed broadly two pathways, 
towards what I call rule by noblemen and rule by commanders. 
As Delhi witnessed the phenomenon that James Tod called fleeting 
phantoms of royalty, major provincial rulers loyal to Delhi such as the 
Nizam in Hyderabad, Murshid Quli Khan in Bengal, and Safdarjang in 
Awadh consolidated their finances and armies, and in their capacity as 
‘advisors’ to the Emperor grew more powerful than the Emperor himself. 
While formally owing allegiance, they profited from the troubles the 
Emperor faced coping with rebellions and invasions. Despite the relatively 
peaceful transition, these regimes faced insurrection by landlords, and at 
times that of the military commanders. But they escaped usurpation of 
state power. There were several stabilizing forces at work. A substantial 
number of military tenures remained loyal to the king, who commanded 
symbolic authority as a representative of the Emperor, though the state 
had lost the authority to enforce transferability of these rights. Further, 
banking was relatively advanced in these regions, and the rulers 
commanded credit. 
Away from the spheres of influence of the Mughal governors, or 
Nawabs, state formation followed a different trajectory. The west ruled by 
                                                            
27 J.F. Richards, ‘Mughal State Finance and the Premodern World Economy’, 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 23(2), 1981, pp. 285-308. 
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Rajput states, the western Deccan ruled by the weak state of Bijapur, and 
in the south the states left behind by Aurangzeb’s unfinished conquests, 
had never been administratively or politically integrated into the Empire. 
Their own spheres of authority, however, were contested in the early 
eighteenth century. From the turmoil, four major territorial and military 
powers emerged in peninsular India – the Marathas based in Poona, 
Mysore under Haidar Ali, The English East India Company, and the 
French East India Company, both based in the Coromandel coast. If the 
merchant companies are excepted, the pathway to state formation in 
these examples involved assertion of independence by the two 
intermediate orders – commanders and landlords – at the expense of the 
nobility. In the Deccan, Mysore, Punjab, and the lands populated by 
Rajput, Jat and Rohilla Afghans, these agents claimed either kingship or 
vassal status of the Emperor. 
The most consequential example of the second pathway was the 
Maratha domain in the second half of the seventeenth century. The 
individuals and families that later formed Maratha states, had been 
engaged by the Deccan sultans as military commanders and members of 
the irregular army. The position of strength in which these people found 
themselves was the culmination of service under the Deccan sultanates, 
during which hill forts came to be garrisoned by the Marathas.28 Rallying 
under Shivaji, they resisted the sultans, and posed an obstacle to Mughal 
ambitions in the Deccan. By the end of the century, they exercised 
effective control over parts of present-day Maharashtra. In the first half of 
the eighteenth century, the army enlarged in size, and conquests were 
made of Gujarat, Malwa, Bundelkhand, and Berar, which became parts of 
a network that British writers alternatively called ‘empire’, ‘republic’, or 
‘confederacy’, and I will call by a fourth option ‘domain’. In the 1750s, the 
                                                            
28 James Grant Duff, A History of the Mahrattas, vol. 1 of 3, Bombay: Exchange Press, 
1863. 
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north-western tributaries of the Mughal Empire became a target of the 
Afghan rulers. The Marathas had also been making moves towards the 
northwest. In the third battle of Panipat (1761), a combination of Afghan, 
Awadh and Rohilla forces defeated the Maratha army.29 Although losing 
the capacity to carry out further conquests, Maratha forces of 
Bundelkhand and Malwa regrouped and raided both the western 
Gangetic and eastern Rajasthan, until the second and the third Anglo-
Maratha wars (1803-4 and 1817-8) led to annexation of much of their 
lands by the Company. 
Commander-ruled states in northern India arose from Rajput 
rebellions in eastern Rajasthan, and in the western and eastern Gangetic. 
In Rohilkhand or Katehr, an agriculturally prosperous segment of the 
western Gangetic plains, former commanders under the Mughals 
established an independent rule between 1710 and 1750. Rohilla power 
after 1765 was weakened by invasion of Maratha and the Company army. 
A different example of commander rule occurred in Mysore, where a 
military general, Haidar Ali, became the de facto ruler in 1761. For the 
next 38 years, Haidar Ali and his son Tipu Sultan tried to create an 
effective military administration in the region. A final example of the 
formation of a state out of military command was Punjab, where Ranjit 
Singh, who came to power in 1799, succeeded, like Shivaji, in uniting the 
majority of the clans and their chiefs into a viable alliance. The resultant 
improvement in central finances enabled him to strengthen and 
modernize the army. Soon after his death in 1839, inter-clan rivalry 
reappeared, and partly taking advantage of these conflicts, the Company 
annexed Punjab in 1849. 
The core political process in the eighteenth century saw the two 
pathways of state formation become entangled. The commander-ruled 
                                                            
29 On the Maratha-Afghan military contest, see Jos Gommans, ‘Indian Warfare and 
Afghan Innovation during the Eighteenth Century’, Studies in History, 11(3), 1995, pp. 
261-280. 
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states in the Deccan displayed a propensity towards territorial expansion 
not so much by outright conquest as sending military missions to demand 
protection money. Mysore eyed Malabar and Coromandel, and the 
Marathas Delhi, Awadh, Rohilkhand, Punjab, and briefly Bengal. The 
principal targets were the nobility-ruled states, located in the much 
wealthier tracts of land, who responded rarely by military means, and 
more often by means of alliances, tributes, and intrigues. Early in the 
second half of the century, two events presaged a change in this process. 
In 1761, the Peshwa’s army lost at Panipat. And in 1765, the Company 
received the taxation rights of Bengal from the Mughal Emperor. The two 
events did not introduce any immediate or fundamental break, especially 
since the mutinous Afghan army had to leave Delhi. But it led the way to a 
larger role for the Company in the north Indian theatre, and increased the 
choice of ‘protectors’. The Company now became a useful ally to some, 
and a potential threat to the survival of any ruler who did not negotiate. In 
a series of battles, the Company fought with all of the major powers, with 
the exception of the Nizam. It suffered reverses and losses in the 1770s, 
but from the 1790s, won the battles that made a difference to the future 
political map of India. 
 It is well-known in military history that the Company’s success 
partly owed to an army that was more capital-intensive than those of its 
rivals and dependencies. Where did the capital come from? 
 
 
Patterns of Military-Fiscalism 
I consider a scenario where the proportion of state expenditure on 
army is relatively high, and the state expands the scale of revenues, to be 
the mark of sustainable expansion of fiscal capacity driven by military 
goals. It is not easy to measure the index. The Company maintained 
regular accounts, if in an archaic style, to show to the Parliament how 
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much its Indian adventures cost. Public finance accounts of the Indian 
states are hard to find and harder to read. The scarcity of aggregate data 
is compounded by the fact that by far the larger part of the rich historical 
scholarship on eighteenth century Maratha and Mysore deals with 
diplomatic and military history. On the other hand, this difference in the 
quality of data illustrates the very hypothesis I examine here, that the 
attempt at fiscal consolidation proceeded in an uneven fashion. The 
difficulty of estimating the income of any state in this time was the 
presence of multiple claimants (kings and jagirdars) and multiple centres 
(core zone and tributary zones). 
Despite these difficulties, two facts cannot be disputed. The 
proportion of the military in total expenditure was universally high in the 
second half of the century (Table 1). And the revenue flows to all Indian 
states together fell in the eighteenth century (Table 2). There was only 
one exception to the second proposition, and that was the Company. 
There was no dramatic increase in revenue immediately after the 
takeover of fiscal administration in Bengal. The 1770 Bengal famine even 
destroyed some of the initial gains. However, there was acceleration 
thereafter as the Company consolidated its land administration. On the 
Indian side, the falls partly reflected territorial losses but not wholly so. 
The crisis owed to a weakening hold of the state upon its revenue 
assignees and officers. The revenue per unit of area or population did not 
rise to offset territorial losses. The Peshwa’s revenues declined from £ 4 
million in 1765 to 2.1 million in 1813 and 1.6 before British takeover.30 In 
1770, Haidar Ali’s dominions yielded revenue of about 0.8 million, which 
                                                            
30 Calculations by V.G. Khobrekar, cited by V.D. Divekar, ‘Survey of Material in Marathi 
on the Economic and Social History of India - 2’, Indian Economic and Social History 
Review, 15(2), pp. 221-240. 
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Tipu’s conquests increased to 2.8 in 1792.31 The territory carved up by 
the alliance between the Company, Nizam, and the Marathas after the fall 
of Tipu produced revenue of £1.4 million. The territory of Mysore returned 
to the Wodeyar king produced estimated revenue of 0.4 million (Table 3). 
Other instances of decline include Rohilkhand, where the end of Rohilla 
power led to a significant fall in revenues flowing into the Awadh state.32 
The Company could not finance wars from its income. The 
proportion of interest-bearing-debt-to-revenue ratio rose from 120 per 
cent in 1793 to over 300 in 1809, declining to 200 per cent in 1833.33 90 
per cent of the war finance was raised in India. Although the cost of credit 
was about half (5 per cent) in England of that in India, the share of the 
English money market did not rise until after the territorial wars were over. 
In other words, all major rival states in the late-eighteenth century 
competed for money in the same money market. Credit was also critical 
to the other states. Possibly a quarter of the aggregate Maratha revenues 
in 1763-5 came from loans. Rs. 10 million were taken from the bankers, 
according to one estimate for the 1760s.34 Where then was a difference 
between British territories and their Indian rivals? In Peshwa’s territory, 
debt service in the 1760s took away about a third of the net income of the 
state. There is reason to believe that Panipat left a permanent effect upon 
sovereign debt. In British India, in the decade of the third Anglo-Maratha 
wars, debt service as a percentage of revenue fell from nearer 20 per 
cent to 12 per cent.35 In the second and the third Anglo-Maratha wars, the 
                                                            
31 Sanjay Subrahmanyam, ‘Warfare and State Finance in Wodeyar Mysore 1724-25: A 
Missionary Perspective’, Indian Economic and Social History Review, 26(2), 1989, pp. 
203-233. . 
32 E.I. Brodkin, ’British India and the Abuses of Power: Rohilkhand under Early 
Company Rule’, Indian Economic and Social History Review, 10(2), 1973, pp. 129-56. 
33 B.P.P. 1810 (363) Select Committee, pp. 94-96; Charles Macfarlane, A History of 
British India, London: George Routledge, 1853, p. 522. 
34 V.D. Divekar, ‘The Emergence of an Indigenous Business Class in Maharashtra in 
the Eighteenth Century’, Modern Asian Studies, 16(3), 1982, pp. 427-443. 
35 W.H. Sykes, ‘The Past, Present, and Prospective Financial Conditions of British 
India’, Journal of the Statistical Society of London, 22(4), 1859, pp. 455-480. 
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Maratha states raised money by mortgaging the right to give land 
grants.36 These figures suggest that sustainable capacity to borrow varied 
according to taxable capacity. 
                                                            
36 The Company’s dependencies by then were under a burden of tribute that left them 
financially incapable of raising an army, and bound by treaties that restrained their 
military options. For Awadh, see Copy Proceedings and Correspondence relative to the 
State and Condition of the Country of Oude and its Dependencies, and of the Reigning 
Family thereof; including the Charges made by Mr. Hastings against Mr. Bristow, &c. 
&c. &c., p. 30 
 
 
20
Table 1. Military Charges in Total Revenue 
 Percentage of direct military 
expenditure in revenue 
Bengal, Bombay, Madras, 1796-1797, averagea 81 
Combined British territories, 1819-20b 65 
Awadh, 1784-1792, averagec 74 
Peshwa’s territory, c. 1780d 80 
Hyderabad, c. 1800e >40 
Mysore, 1799f 40-80 
 
Notes: 
a. British Parliamentary Papers, ‘An Account of the Annual Revenues of the East India 
Company’. 
b. W.H. Sykes, ‘The Past, Present, and Prospective Financial Conditions of British India’, 
Journal of the Statistical Society of London, 22(4), 1859, pp. 455-480. 
c. Tribute paid to the Company for the defence of Awadh (average over 1786-1792) is taken 
as a proportion of revenues (average over 1784-89). Letters, Political, Military and 
Commercial on the Present State and Government on the Province of Oudh and its 
Dependencies, c. 1793. 
d. The revenue corresponds to actual inflow of cash into the treasury, and expenditure 
consists of payment to troops ‘who receive their allowances in ready money’, and 
maintenance of the 700-odd forts. ‘Of the Productions and Peculiarities of the Marratta 
Country’, Asiatic Miscellany, 1792, pp. 153-162. The revenue estimate is based on 
impression. But the amount, Rs. 50 million, is not improbable, since official accounts show 
that in 1789, total inflow of tribute to the Peshwa state from subahs in Hindustan and 
Gujarat amounted to Rs. 21 million, see V.S. Kadam, Maratha Confederacy, Delhi: 
Munshiram Manoharlal, 1993, pp. 74-5. 
e. Refers to c. 1830, and includes tribute to the Company and expenditure on domestic 
troops. I assume that the 1800 expenditure on the military establishment exceeded this 
percentage because of the ongoing hostilities with Mysore, p. 62. 
f. Infantry wages are assumed to range between Rs. 50 and 100 and cavalry Rs. 200 and 
400 per annum. The foot-soldiers of Maratha households (paga) in 1800 earned Rs. 8 per 
month. The cavalry-infantry wage-ratio was usually 4:1 in the case of Awadh and the 
Company. For revenue, see Table 3. The assumptions are conservative. In a market 
characterized by high risk and high demand, wage structure was unstable. The salaries of 
European mercenaries as well as Indian commanders and musketeers immediately before 
a battle bore little relation with the regular pay and allowances of foot soldiers. In the 1764 
Buxar campaign the Awadh Nawab Shujauddaula paid Rs. 300-1000 per month to his 
European commanders. Bartholomew Burges, A Series of Indostan Letters, New York, 
1790, p. xxii. 
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Table 2. Estimated State Income, 1667-1853 (million £) 
 c. 1667 1707-09 1764 1800 1818 1853 
Revenues of all states in 
India 
26a 38b - 22-29 - 34c 
British Indiad - - 3 8 13 21 
Indian states 26 38 - 14-21e - 13 
Major Indian states 
(before annexation) 
      
Awadh 0.8 0.9a - 0.8 - 1.4 
Hyderabad - 2.8a - - - 1.5 
Bengal, Bihar, Orissa 3.6 2.8a 2.6 - - - 
Peshwad - - 4.0 4.0 1.6 - 
       
a. Aggregate of all Mughal provinces. Irfan Habib, The Agrarian System of Mughal India 
1556-1707, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 455-9. 
b. Aggregate of all Mughal provinces. William Bolts, Considerations on India Affairs, 
London: J. Almon, 1772, p. 17. 
c. See Table 5. 
d. British Parliamentary Papers (B.P.P.) 1810 (363), Select Committee on Affairs of East 
India Company Second Report, Appendix, pp. 16-26; Sykes, ‘Past, Present, and 
Prospective Financial Conditions’. 
e. Estimates exist for some of the Maratha territories, and Awadh (Table 3). A segment of 
these two regions accounted for half the revenues of the princely states in 1853. On 
this basis, I consider that the princely states we do not have any data for could produce 
over half but less than two-thirds of the income of the Indian states. Two estimates of 
aggregate Maratha revenues in this time produce 12 million (1792) and 16 million 
pounds (1800). If we accept these numbers, the revenue of the Indian states should 
increase to 28-32 million, still smaller than the number for 1707. However, these were 
conjectural numbers, and hugely exaggerated the taxable capacity of the Maratha 
domains in Hindustan. 
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Table 3. Area and Estimated Revenue, 1780-1817  
 Approximate 
territorial extent 
in square miles 
Estimated 
revenue, 
million £ 
Revenue 
per square 
mile 
Mysore, 1799 (after annexation)a   29,000 0.41 14.2
Peshwa, 1780b 120,000 4.00-5.00 33.0-41.7
Peshwa, 1800c 120,000 4.00 33.0
Peshwa (after annexation), 1818d   50,000 0.50 10.0
Bhonsle and Sindhia (after 
annexation), 1818e 
  70,000 0.25   3.6
Bengal, 1795f 110,000 5.80 52.0
Awadh, 1781g   29,000 0.70 24.1
Awadh, 1801g   29,000 0.79 26.5
Travancore, 1807h     8,100 0.25 30.9
 
Sources: 
a. James Mill, A History of British India 1805-1835, vol. 1, London: James Madden, 1858, 
pp. 4. The figures, reported in Kanthirai pagoda, were converted at the rate of 3 current 
rupees to a pagoda. 
b. V.D. Divekar, ‘Survey of Material in Marathi on the Economic and Social History of 
India - 2’, Indian Economic and Social History Review, 15(2), pp. 221-240, and 
‘Productions and Peculiarities’, Asiatic Miscellany. For want of a better benchmark, I 
have retained the size of the Bombay Presidency as the proxy for tributary area. A mid-
nineteenth century source places the size of the territory at 100,000 square miles. 
William Henry Tone, ‘Illustrations of Some Institutions of the Mahratta People’, Calcutta 
Review, 4(7), July-December 1845, pp. 178-240. The revenue is the amount actually 
deposited in the treasury. 
c. John Taylor, Letters on India, London: Carpenter, 1800, p. 194. 
d. H.H. Wilson, A History of British India 1805-1835, vol.2, London: James Madden, 1858, 
pp. 279-80. The Peshwa’s territory acquired by the Company after the third Anglo-
Maratha war amounted to an estimated 50,000 square miles and extended from 
Khandesh to Canara, and Konkan to western Deccan. The tributary domain was 
considerably smaller than the area from which the Peshwa had received income in 
1780. 
e. Wilson, History, vol. 2, p. 283. Both the area and the revenue seem to have been 
underestimated. 
f. British Parliamentary Papers, ‘An Account of the Annual Revenues of the East India 
Company’. 
g. H.M. Lawrence, Essays, Military and Political Written in India, London: W.H. Allen, 
1859, p. 101. The figures, when reported in Fyzabad rupees, were converted using the 
exchange of 2.9 Fyzabad rupees to a current rupee. 
h. Mill, History, vol. 1, p. 5. 
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The access to increasing sums of money allowed the Company to 
expand its standing army between Plassey and the Sikh wars (Table 4). 
The decision to do so was motivated less by long-term planning, and 
rather more by immediate anxieties regarding the Indian powers. Long 
before the Company became active in north Indian politics, its obsession 
with the defences of the Fort William in Calcutta made a Dutch observer 
remark, ‘if they ever lose their power here, their fall will, in all probability, 
proceed from the heavy expences, which they sustain, in keeping up so 
important a military establishment…’37 By contrast, their chief adversaries 
were in this time becoming dependent on supply of irregular soldiers by 
their allies. These heavy expenditure commitments exerted a path 
dependence effect and made military planning a long-term affair rather 
than one that adapted to every battle. 
The increasing financial capacity allowed the Company to make 
forward-looking employment contracts. A simple comparison of salaries 
will be misleading, because pay practices depended on the composition 
of the army. There was, however, an emerging contrast in the 
implementation of any employment contract. The source of the contrast 
was the feasibility of altering the proportion of regular and irregular 
categories. Flexibility in this respect meant that the salaries of the 
Maratha infantry rarely followed the stated regulations. Haidar Ali paid 
fixed wages to his cavalry, but stretched by the campaign against the 
tributary kings, reduced the number of days of service, ‘the balance being 
supposed to be made up by .. plunder’.38 The predominance of irregulars 
and short-term credit made war budget an on-the-spot affair, a good 
illustration being the financing of Panipat by means of raids in Delhi. 
There is no record of a pension plan for soldiers in the Indian armies. 
                                                            
37 J.S. Stavorinus, Voyages to the East Indies, London: J. Robinson, 1798, vol. 1 of 3, 
p. 498. 
38 Lewin B. Bowring, Rulers of India: Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1893, p. 78 
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Land grants were made, but not according to a stated policy as far as one 
can see. In the early nineteenth century, the Company had a policy of 
rewarding long service. The Bengal army resettled invalids and retired 
soldiers with land grants.39 In Madras, half-pay pensions were granted 
after 22 years of service.40 These policies had a practical aim. The 
challenging task before the Company’s military command in the second 
quarter of the nineteenth century was how to disband large number of 
soldiers in a peaceful manner. The retirement scheme attained this 
goal.41 
At the time of the final conflict with the Marathas, the Company was 
earning a much larger income than any of the Indian states, from a 
territorial extent still smaller than that controlled by the Indian states. Only 
a small part of this income can be explained by tributes from dependent 
regimes. In 1795, two-third or more of the income was generated 
internally, whereas only half or less of the cash inflow into the Peshwa’s 
treasury came from land revenue. And this internally generated stream 
was higher per square mile of territory controlled by the Company, so far 
as we can measure (Table 2). 
The hint that regional resources played a part in the fiscal effort can 
be confirmed from a more uniform set of data that became available 
somewhat later in a pamphlet on financial transactions between the 
Company and the states (Table 5). By the time the data were compiled, c. 
1850, the political contest had ended, tribute giving and taking reduced in 
scale, and in most regions new administrative institutions had been set 
up. By and large revenues still came mainly from land tax and therefore 
                                                            
39 Seema Alavi, ‘The Company Army and Rural Society: The Invalid Thanah 1780-
1830’, Modern Asian Studies, 27(1), 1993, pp. 147-178. 
40 Lorenzo M. Crowell, ‘Military Professionalism in a Colonial Context: The Madras 
Army, circa 1832’, Modern Asian Studies, 24(2), 1990, pp. 249-273. 
41 These achievements were short-term. Accounts of the prehistory of the mutiny 
suggest an atrophy of the incentive and reward structures and hardening of racial 
hierarchy in the 1840s. 
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revenue per square mile should reflect the productive power of the region. 
A particular virtue of this dataset is that it is from the same source, 
whereas the data presented in Table 3 is made up of discrete sources. 
Table 4 suggests that in terms of revenue per capita, Indian regions were 
quite similarly placed. However, in terms of revenue per unit of land, there 
was a significant difference. The more advanced regions were, 
predictably, located in the Gangetic plains. The more poorly endowed 
regions were situated in the arid peninsular India. 
What does the comparison tell us? Overall, the revenue generation 
potentials of the Gangetic plains were much higher than in the Deccan 
and central India, because of vast differences in the productivity of land, 
and the larger extent of forests and wastes, the difficulty of transportation, 
high trade costs, and poor access to maritime commerce, in the latter. 
Revenue per square mile can be taken as a proxy for the relative cost of 
administration. For such costs should bear a positive relationship with the 
area administered.42 On that assumption, any contest between Mysore, 
Hyderabad, Punjab, Rajputana, or the Maratha spheres in Hindustan, on 
the one hand, and the Company on the other, was an unsustainable one. 
This is, of course, not the whole story, for it begs the question of why pre-
British Awadh or Bengal had failed to emerge as militarily the dominant 
force in the eighteenth century.  
It is proposed in the next section that the difference reflected the 
effectiveness with which the Company could subject the intermediate 
orders to the demands of the treasury. Such strategies stemmed from a 
manner of political calculation that was not indigenous to India, and had 
consequences for military policy. 
                                                            
42 It is possible to argue that while it could vary positively with population density, 
relatively wages should fall. A large and sparsely populated territory could raise both 
types of cost. 
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Table 4. Approximate Size of Armies, Major Battles and Reserves 
 1740-50 1750-60 1760-70 1770-80 1780-90 1790-
1800 
1800-10 1810-35
Maratha 80,000a  70,000b 56,000c   50,000d 
Mysore   23,000e 45,000f 58,000f  
Pre-
British 
Bengal 
25,000a 50,000g  
Awadh   61,200h 
Company   3,000g 35,000i 70,000j 153,000k 130,000l 
         
a. The size of Maratha army under Bhaskar Pandit sent to Bengal, 1742, and the army of 
Alivardi Khan. William Bolts, Considerations, pp. 8-9. 
b. Panipat, 1761, including cavalry 56,000, of which 2,000 belonged to Ibrahim Khan Gardi. 
Two contemporary accounts on the battle using different sources are, ‘An Account of the 
Battle of Panipat’, Asiatic Researches, 3, 1799, pp. 91-140, translation of the Persian 
manuscript by Casi Raja (Kashiraj) Pandit, vakil of Awadh and an eyewitness; and Seir 
Mutaqharin of Ghulam Husain Khan, Calcutta: R. Cambray, vol. 3 of 3, pp. 385-9. They 
produce similar numbers, but also suggest that numbers for Panipat are unreliable, 
because of the preponderance of irregulars and camp-followers on both sides, numbering 
several hundred thousands. 
c. Wadgaon 1779, cavalry 16,000. M.R. Kantak, The First Anglo-Maratha War, Bombay: 
Popular Prakashan, 1993, p. 71. 
d. Assaye, 1803. The size of the reserve army, like aggregate revenue (see Table 3), is 
estimated to be much larger. But in no single major battle, more than a third of such 
numbers could be mustered. 
e. 1767, Haidar Ali’s forces, include 11,000 irregular cavalry. Roy, ‘Military Synthesis’, p. 668. 
Also account of the march to Erode, 1768, in Lewin B. Bowring, Rulers of India: Haidar Ali 
and Tipu Sultan, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1893, p. 56, and the account of the battle with 
Eyre Coote in Porto Novo, 1780, Ibid., p. 98, for a similar total but a larger cavalry. 
f. 1780, Haidar Ali’s army, 28,000 cavalry. In addition, there were 40,000 ‘peons’ or irregulars. 
Charles Macfarlane, A History of British India, London: George Routledge, 1853, p. 183. 
1790, Tipu Sultan, cavalry 20,000. 
g. Battle of Plassey, 1757. 15,000 cavalry in the Bengal side. Peter Harrington, Plassey 1757, 
London: Osprey, 1994. J.S. Stavorinus reports 50,000 foot and 18,000 horses on the Indian 
side, and 3,000 on the English side, including 900 Europeans, Voyages to the East Indies, 
London: J. Robinson, 1798, vol. 1 of 3, p. 486. 
h. 1792, potential size comprising of all jagirs, cavalry 13,400. Letters, Political, Military and 
Commercial on the Present State and Government on the Province of Oudh and its 
Dependencies, c. 1793. 
i. Wadgaon, 1779. Kantak, Anglo-Maratha War, p. 71. 
j. 2,340 cavalry. 
k. Size of standing army in 1808, 10,400 cavalry. British Parliamentary Papers 1810 (363) 
Select Committee on Affairs of East India Company Second Report. 
l. Size of standing army in 1832, 12,000 cavalry. 
 
 
27
Table 5. Area, Population, and Estimated Revenue, 1853  
 Area (sq 
miles) 
Population 
(millions) 
Revenue 
(million £) 
Revenue/
capita 
Revenue/
sq mile 
Hyderabad   80,000 10.7   1.50 0.14 18.8
Gwalior   25,000   3.2   0.32 0.10 12.9
Indore   10,000   0.8   0.22 0.27 22.0
Mysore   29,000   4.0   0.69 0.17 23.8
Berar 113,000   4.6   0.49 0.11   4.3
Awadh   29,000   6.5   1.40 0.22 48.3
Mewar   13,000   1.0   0.14 0.14 10.8
Punjab 105,000 14.6   1.24 0.08 11.8
Travancore    8,100   1.3   0.46 0.36 56.5
North-western 
Provinces 
  81,500 28.2   6.12 0.22 75.1
Bengal Presidency 155,000 42.5 11.22 0.26 72.4
Bombay Presidency 123,100 12.9   4.71 0.37 38.3
Madras Presidency 139,000 22.0   5.32 0.24 38.3
 
Source: Anonymous, The Native States of India, 1853. The author of the 27-page 
pamphlet was possibly Edward Thornton, the East India House officer who prepared a 
number of pre-mutiny Gazetteers, and was also the author of Statistical Papers relating 
to India, London: East India Company, 1853, which was the main source for the 
figures. Some of the area figures come from the Statistical Abstracts of India. 
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Patterns of Institutional Response 
It is necessary to connect three isolated propositions implicit in the 
scholarship on the eighteenth century. First, there was a growing distance 
between regions in the relationship between the state and the 
intermediate orders, that is, tax officers and land grantees. Second, linked 
with this divergence, the states had variable capacities to create and 
control their forces. And third, location mattered to the disciplining 
capacity of the rulers. 
In pre-colonial Bengal, Hyderabad, and Awadh, the structure of 
proprietary rights followed the Mughal principle of awarding jagirs, and 
awarding the right to award jagirs, to nobles loyal to the king. These 
jagirs, however, were treated as heritable property.43 In Hyderabad, there 
was a largely peaceful passage into a harmonious partnership between 
the ruler and the landholders from the late eighteenth century, made 
possibly by the retreating military threat. In Awadh, the peaceful transition 
to a successor state had made the zamindars more powerful and 
assertive. The Awadh Nawabs were partially successful in containing 
revolts in the west, whereas in the east, groups with more resources and 
military strength broke away. Facing the Maratha threat, the regime 
became militarily dependent on the Company, financially bankrupt, and 
lost control over the local agents in the fiscal system. English reaction to a 
crisis that they had themselves created in some measure was at first 
respectful submission of accounts showing a massive credit balance. The 
mood changed in the nineteenth century, when intelligence from Lucknow 
made a thinly veiled case for takeover, since ‘without our sepoys [the 
nawab] could not have .. collected a rupee of revenue.’44 ‘The present 
sovereign of Oude is just what might be expected of a person brought up 
                                                            
43 Karen Leonard, ‘The Hyderabad Political System and its Participants’, Journal of 
Asian Studies, 30(3), 1971, pp. 569-582. 
44 Macfarlane, History, p. 163. 
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in a harem.’45 Statements such as these reflected the losing relevance of 
the Nawab for English interests in north India. But the picture was not far 
from the truth. What it omitted to mention was that the induced 
bankruptcy had left few options to the ruler, who concentrated his 
energies on literary and musical pursuits. Bengal by contrast displayed 
swings in the balance of power between the state and the substantial 
landlords who supplied military service as well. Murshid Quli succeeded 
in wresting more taxes from them. But his harsh punitive measures were 
never accepted by the nobility, and quickly reversed by his successor. 
Thereafter, some of the larger estates, such as the Burdwan Raj studied 
by John McLane, prospered in the eighteenth century.46 In the 1740s, the 
Nawab Alivardi Khan needed to press many landlords into military service 
to deal with the Marathas. Faced with potential takeover by the Company, 
the last independent Nawab Mir Kasim again tried to recast the equation, 
only to lose in the battlefield. 
If in these examples we see the nobility-cum-gentry groups 
maintain control over arms and the means of collecting money, in the 
commander-ruled states, we see a propensity towards gifting away these 
means to commanders. In the case of nearly all the major Rajput states in 
the eighteenth century, military tenure holders became powerful as a 
result of the Maratha threat, and often turned kingmakers in their own 
domain. The most important case, of course, is the Marathas themselves. 
Although Shivaji had created an apparatus of state, and made some 
proclamations on good governance, his real legacy was not institutions of 
state, but an army funded by central resources. The army, consisting of 
an infantry and a mobile light cavalry, proved itself effective against the 
Mughal army, the core of which was formed of a cavalry that was heavily 
                                                            
45 J. Sutherland, Sketches of the Relations subsisting between the British Government 
in India and the Different States, Calcutta: Military Orphan Press, 1837, p. 45. 
46 Land and Local Kingship in Eighteenth-Century Bengal, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993. 
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armed and moved slowly. In the early eighteenth century, there were 
several such units that joined to lead the main territorial conquests. These 
bands were individually too small to pose a threat to a large organized 
army, but sufficiently large and mobile to make imperial armies 
ineffective.47 Outright conquest, in other words, was not always a feasible 
strategy to raise taxable wealth. But sharp and frequent raids could 
paralyze the enemy enough to force a negotiation on tax sharing. 
With the expansion of the territorial extent under Bajirao I, and the 
need to maintain military outposts in distant tributary zones, a different 
form of military-fiscal strategy was required. A general contrast can be 
drawn between zones of origin and zones of conquest. In zones of origin, 
that is, in the western Maharashtra territories where the Peshwa ruled, 
land grants were made to military chiefs to provide sustenance for the 
troops under their pay, creating a modified jagirdari system. In turn, the 
jagirdars as well as the state relied on Brahmin and other state officers for 
conducting the businesses of state. Some of these officers emerged into 
the mainstream and became landlords in turn. In zones of conquest, on 
the other hand, the landlords who had served the Mughal provincial state 
continued to function under the Marathas, who employed a credible threat 
upon the landlords to make them comply. What kept this machine running 
was the subsidy from Hindustan contributing to the consolidation of the 
intermediate order in Maharashtra. The flow was kept in place by a 
collection of self-financing military outposts at the exterior. The budget of 
each commander was separated from the central budget, and instead of 
provinces being financed out of a central pool of resources, the centre 
was subsidized by tributes from the provinces. As long as tribute came in 
from zones of conquest to subsidize the zones of origin, the whole could 
sustain its military enterprise. However, 1761 put a check upon 
                                                            
47 Stewart Gordon, ‘The Slow Conquest: Administrative Integration of Malwa into the 
Maratha domain, 1720-1760’, Modern Asian Studies, 11(1), 1977, pp. 1-40. 
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conquests, and 1803 saw serious territorial loss. The zones of origin, 
where fiscal administration had deteriorated by then, could not sustain 
military effort on its own and became a British dependency. The 
disintegration of the fiscal system had been developing more gradually for 
a long time. At the time of the alliance with the English, the Peshwa ‘has 
not sufficient power to levy the kist. The jagheerdars of the southern 
frontier are in a great degree independent of him, and pay him but a 
trifling, if any tribute.’48 The dissensions among Maratha chiefs, the 
increasingly disputatious nature of any accession in Poona, and the 
withholding of tribute from other branches of the domain even before 
territorial loss, need to be seen in the context of this endogenous 
economic crisis. 
In Mysore, a great part of the extraordinary energies of Haidar Ali 
and Tipu Sultan was taken up in centralizing revenue. These efforts were 
disturbed by the fact that both rulers needed to maintain the flow of 
money from the tributary kings, which mission dissipated a great deal of 
the state resources, and made the fiscal enterprise too dependent on 
territorial expansion. To overcome the dilemma, Tipu issued a set of 
detailed regulations aiming to nationalize a number of trades, widen tax 
base, and improve compliance. Historians have come too close to 
reading Tipu’s regulations as evidence of real change.49 The effect of the 
measures, in fact, is a matter of guesswork. The overwhelming focus of 
the regulations was a direct contract (‘a promise of engagement from a 
superior to an inferior’) between the state and the cultivator. The agent in 
charge of implementing that contract on behalf of the state was the village 
officer, which was a more or less hereditary office attached to the village 
and paid for with rent-free land. The regulations make it abundantly clear 
                                                            
48 Anonymous (‘An Officer in the Service of the East India Company’), Origin of the 
Pindaries, London: John Murray, 1818, p. 141. 
49 Nikhiles Guha, Pre-British State System in South India: Mysore 1761-1799, Calcutta: 
Ratna Prakashan, 1985. 
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that neither this officer nor the amil (revenue-officer), mutsuddy (clerk) 
and kelladar (fort in charge) commanded the trust of the state. The 
regulations are filled with orders that start with the words, ‘it has been the 
practice in the districts’, and warning that such practices could invite the 
‘severest displeasure’ of the huzoor (government). These include revenue 
farming in which clerks, accountants, and other officers indulged in, and 
the routine practice of village officers coercing the peasants to work their 
own lands. ‘Falsehood is an offence of the highest nature .. and God has 
declared the lyar to be a companion of Satan’ – the regulations remind 
the amil, who had a realistic hope of evading punishment in this world.50 
The regulations leave one with the impression that these were attempts to 
mend a flawed system, flawed in that they were injunctions addressed to 
an officer-cum-gentry elite who could not be removed from their rights to 
village assets, and who, using their entrenched power, worked at cross 
purposes with the state. 
The Company’s mission in Bengal had been moving on a different 
trajectory. Soon after British takeover of the fiscal authority of Bengal 
(1765) and during the first round of land surveys conducted by a 
Committee of Circuit (1771), the administrators of Bengal agreed that it 
would be inadvisable to try to raise revenues ‘by destroying all the 
intermediate order of men between the ruler and the cultivator’.51 But they 
also faced a situation where a large number of landlords and their 
associates failed to meet their revenue engagements from incapacity, 
mismanagement, or worse, a feeling that the new state like the old ones 
did not pose a credible threat. This threat earlier materialized in the shape 
of a visit by a state officer accompanied by a group of armed men, whose 
                                                            
50 British India Analyzed: The Provincial and Revenue Establishments of Tipu Sultan, 
London: E. Jeffrey, 1793, vol. 1, p. 90. 
51 Philip Francis, Original Minutes of the Governor-General and Council of Fort William 
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job it was to inspect the reasons for default, and take punitive action if 
appropriate. The penalty rarely included dispossession from tenure 
unless it was a question of disloyalty. This instrument had repeatedly 
failed to work, even failed to appear, during the Nawabi regime. While 
expressing the need for a credible threat, the regime upheld the 
hereditary proprietary rights of the landlords, acknowledging ‘that the 
Zemindars, Talookdars, &c. were the hereditary proprietors [of land], and 
gave testimonies in favour of their rights’. 
It was considered that ‘[t]he fear of the sale of their lands is the only 
probable instrument of keeping them to their engagements; and the 
actual sale of them is the only means of reimbursing the Government if 
they fail’.52 A universal rule by coercion would be inviting trouble. A rule 
by market had the advantage that it separated the good from the bad 
zamindar, and reduced the costs of policing. The only resistance to the 
scheme was likely to come from the larger zamindars. The policing 
problem was to ensure compliance of these people. Subdivision of 
estates into smaller lots, whether via auction or inheritance law was in this 
context ‘for the interest of the Government’.53 
How was this mechanism put in place? Between 1770 and 1793, 
landlord asset was made more marketable, and increased in value as 
collateral. The Company was beginning to overhaul the legal 
infrastructure by instituting a set of courts and uniform procedural law. 
The claim to landed property became verifiable in the courts of common 
law rather than the courts of Islamic law, courts of the royalty, or courts of 
the peasant communities as before. Further, the state made the state-
landlord relationship a contractual one, meaning that the failure to pay 
revenues led to resumption and sale of estate to the highest bidder. The 
revenue auction element diluted and weakened the military element 
                                                            
52 Ibid., p. 12. 
53 Ibid., p. 16 
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among the landlords, as it did in Awadh and Hyderabad, and brought in 
bankers and officers of state into the landlord cadre. On the other hand, 
the presence of common law courts defined and strengthened landlord 
right. It was this quid-pro-quo that explains why the revolution could be 
carried through with comparatively little resistance from the landlords. 
These two principles were generalized in the Permanent Settlement of 
1793. What followed these reforms is too well-known to be repeated in 
detail. An outburst of auction sales did splinter the large estates, and 
brought in a whole set of new people.54 Within a few years, the military 
and nobility element in the landlord class had completely dissipated. The 
outcome of the new paradigm on revenues was dramatic. Bengal 
revenues increased from a figure nearer £2 million in the last days of the 
Nawab to over £5 million 25 years after Company takeover. The increase 
was achieved not by making land produce more, but wholly by wresting 
more from the landlords. 
The relationship between the state and the intermediate order cast 
a shadow on the formation of the army. The Indian armies were 
constituted of soldiers supplied by the holders of military-fiscal tenures, 
with a large number of irregulars among them. Such decentralization 
saved the king much money, but made three types of hazard more likely. 
First, the commanders tended to include spoils from predatory raids into 
their reward structure, which made the level of war effort conditional upon 
prospect of personal gain. Second, the coalitional nature of the large 
armies made command a difficult problem. The decentralized nature of 
the army could cause adverse chain reaction. When the chance of a 
defeat increased during a battle, factions left the battlefield increasing the 
likelihood of defeat. On one occasion when the divided command was to 
cause utter devastation, Panipat, the commanders had taken ‘no account 
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of any troops but those immediately under their own.’55 More generally, 
Maratha ‘Sirdars followed their own interests’, a Maharashtrian historian 
observed.56 Clearly, they needed to since they paid for their own troops. It 
was only on rare occasions that charismatic chiefs held disparate factions 
together. And their death led the whole army to slide back into chaos. 
This is what happened to the Sindhia army after the death of Mahadaji, 
and the Sikh army after Ranjit Singh. In both cases British victory in 
battlefield owed to factionalism. The Indian states’ attempts to induct 
Europeans created new conflicts of interest. The mixing of command 
structures and patterns with the induction of the Europeans left units 
confused and indecisive. The exit of Benoit de Boigne in 1795 weakened 
and divided military command in the Sindhia camp. The new General 
Pierre Cuillier-Perron was not trusted by the king, Daulatrao, and as it 
turned out a few years later, nor by many of the officers, Indian and 
European. 
The third problem was posed by the irregulars. For an idea of the 
scale, at Panipat, irregulars outnumbered regular soldiers 4:1 in the 
Durrany camp, and irregulars and camp-followers outnumbered soldiers 
8:1 in the Maratha camp. The loss of life on a genocidal scale at this 
battle had much to do with the preponderance of non-combatants and 
semi-combatants. The number of camp-followers was large in the 
Company’s army as well, but maintained a considerably smaller ratio, 3:1 
according to a 1791 statement.57 Being responsible for their capital cost, 
irregular soldiers were risk-averse and could not be easily integrated into 
military strategy. Towards the end of the century, the most important 
group among Maratha irregulars were the pendhary or Pindari, light 
cavalry who owned their horses and equipment, were not compensated if 
injured or suffered loss of horse, and therefore, felt no particular 
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allegiance to any leader other than their own headmen. In peacetimes 
they pursued agriculture or other professions, during battles they were 
called in or joined on their own. There was a close association between 
conditions of agriculture and the incentive to join the irregular forces. 
‘[T]he numbers of the Pindaries may be said to increase in the same ratio, 
as the means of subsistence diminish.’58 For the main force, they had 
value in raiding campaigns. ‘In action, it was their custom immediately 
after the regulars had charged and broken the enemy, to fall upon them 
sword in hand, and complete the rout.’59 But they could become a liability 
in a battle against a disciplined army. 
The Pindaries were not popular with any of the major powers of the 
time. And yet, the logic of conflicts in the eighteenth century increased the 
supply of such soldiers to any new state that might wish to make use of 
them. Every military debacle released a large number of stragglers, 
deserters, and soldiers without command. Mercenary units that enlisted 
such people performed a significant column of support for the new armies 
raised.60 Mahadaji Sindhia recruited from the remnants of Panipat, Ranjit 
Singh from the remnants of Assaye and Laswari, and the Holkars from 
the disbanded soldiery of Awadh and Rohilkhand. Some of them were 
retrained and absorbed in the regular army, but many remained outside 
the core army. Tipu Sultan’s cavalry consisted of three units, the regulars 
(silahdars), the regulars who supplied their own horses, and kazzaks or 
predatory cavalry irregulars. The last formed the largest body.61 As 
military conflicts intensified, and states found their territorial control shrink, 
the dependence on irregulars became greater. At the end of the final 
Anglo-Maratha wars, the northern armies relied mainly on the pindaries. 
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Whereas the Indian military enterprise was increasingly dependent 
upon what one historian calls ‘old feudal elements’, the Company could 
create a unidirectional command structure owing to its reliance on regular 
forces.62 More than the reliance on regular soldiers, the recruitment 
structure made a difference. The Company recruited its main body of 
soldiery from the Gangetic plains. At the time of the Anglo-Maratha wars, 
the Company did also recruit Rohilla and European mercenaries, but 
recruiting from other armies was not the preferred strategy. Brahmin and 
Rajput peasants recruited in Awadh and Benares formed the core of the 
standing army in Bengal. In Bombay a deliberate attempt was made to 
recruit down the caste hierarchy, and in Madras, no single community 
was allowed to dominate. In the major example of northern India, many of 
the recruits probably overlapped with the category of armed peasantry 
whose history Dirk Kolff has explored.63 But even if they did, the majority 
did not enjoy an entrenched position in a state army before joining 
Company’s service. Even the so-called upper caste Bhumihar Brahmins 
in Benares came from a milieu were their superior status had been 
disputed. Through carefully crafted social policies that maintained a caste 
hierarchy inside the barracks, the Bengal army managed to preserve a 
situation in which the soldiers felt they enjoyed a higher status in the army 
than outside.64 
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The Company could pursue this course thanks to its location near 
the coasts and the delta. Location translated into military advantage in a 
number of ways. The principal one, of course, was revenue per area. The 
Company also had access to a large body of urban skilled labour based 
in Bombay.65 At the time of the second Anglo-Maratha wars, at short 
notice, labour contractors and headmen could gather carpenters, loggers, 
and blacksmiths together, to build carriages for artillery. Parsi merchants 
took supply contracts for food. In turn, Bombay’s situation as a port made 
it possible for the merchants to import Bengal rice for the troops. Disputes 
over contracts between merchant-suppliers and the stores in-charge did 
occur, but the form of a legal contract made such disputes in principle 
negotiable by a third party. Most importantly, the Bengal army had a 
virtual monopoly of saltpeter supplies and all three ports could cast 
cannons and iron implements on a larger scale and in better quality than 
did enemy forces. In short, access to the port cities with a pool of 
industrial skills and commercial capital offset the disadvantage that 
distance from the overland supply routes could cause.  
These overland supply chains were in decay. The early eighteenth 
century Maratha cavalry was legendary for its ability to subsist on little 
food. A few handfuls of millets collected from cropped field en-route and 
consumed on horseback were all that the riders lived on for days. Even if 
these reports were exaggerated, the small size of these bands made 
supplies a less serious problem than was the case with the Mughal 
armies. However, as the battles became bigger and the forces larger 
supplies were organized differently. The overland supply system relied on 
Banjara bullock trains. The Banjara chieftains, according to later English 
                                                                                                                                                                              
M. Peers, ‘“The Habitual Nobility of Being”: British Officers and the Social Construction 
of the Bengal Army in the Early Nineteenth Century’, Modern Asian Studies, 25(3), 
1991, pp. 545-569. 
65 Randolf G.S. Cooper, ‘Beyond Beasts and Bullion: Economic Considerations in 
Bombay's Military Logistics, 1803’, Modern Asian Studies, 33(1), 1999, pp. 159-183. 
 
 
39
documents, had a special relationship of regard with the Marathas. The 
system was slow, and with territorial losses, at increasing risk of 
interception. On several occasions, beginning with Panipat, the Maratha 
troops were starving when real battle commenced. 
 
 
Conclusion 
To sum up, numbers suggest that the Company alone managed to 
achieve mutually reinforcing growth in wealth and power in eighteenth 
century India. An enabling factor working in their favour was a base in 
resource-rich Bengal and a tributary-cum-predatory relationship with the 
second richest land, Awadh. While playing the competitive game of 
judicious predation, which all prominent military powers in this time 
played, the Company also changed the rules of the game. It changed the 
equation between the state and the groups in command of local power. It 
relied on their loyalty to a lesser extent than did the others, and subdued 
them by a new instrument, the land market. At the same time, persistence 
with shared sovereignty weakened the Indian states in the face of 
sustained conflict. 
I conclude by returning to a global history question that this paper 
started with. Why did political competition empower states in early 
modern Europe, and disempower states in early modern India? Perhaps 
we need to understand the goals of competition and the means of 
competition differently in the Indian example. Initially, the goal was 
judicious predation, and the means militarism rather than governance. 
These means were unsustainable when conflicts became long-term. The 
Company succeeded in adapting the means by wresting control of the 
fiscal order from former commanders and nobles, even as its Indian rivals 
persisted with the tradition of rewarding commanders and nobles with 
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fiscal powers. As the divergence in means continued to grow, the goal 
before the Company changed from predation to imperialism. 
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